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1  The RFID PIA – developed by industry, agreed by 
regulators 
 
 
Sarah Spiekermann, Professor for Business Information Systems Engineering, Vienna 
University of Economics and Business (WU Wien)1 
 
Abstract - This chapter discusses the privacy impact assessment (PIA) framework endorsed 
by the European Commission on February 11th, 2011.2 This PIA, the first to receive the 
Commission’s endorsement, was developed to deal with privacy challenges associated with 
the deployment of radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, a key building block of 
the Internet of Things. The goal of this chapter is to present the methodology and key 
constructs of the RFID PIA Framework in more detail than was possible in the official text. 
RFID operators can use this article as a support document when they conduct PIAs and need 
to interpret the PIA Framework. The chapter begins with a history of why and how the PIA 
Framework for RFID came about. It then proceeds with a description of the endorsed PIA 
process for RFID applications and explains in detail how this process is supposed to function. 
It provides examples discussed during the development of the PIA Framework. These 
examples reflect the rationale behind and evolution of the text’s methods and definitions. The 
chapter also provides insight into the stakeholder debates and compromises that have 
important implications for PIAs in general.  
 
 
1.1  Introduction – The history of the RFID PIA 
 
With more technologies penetrating our everyday lives, maintaining the privacy of personal 
information has become an issue of growing concern. A recent global survey showed that, 
when prompted, 88% of consumers say that they are worried about who has access to their 
data; 84% worry about where their data is stored. Most importantly, such concerns are on the 
rise: 89% state in the same survey that they are becoming more security conscious with their 
data.3 
                                                
1 I particularly want to thank Wolf-Rüdiger Hansen and Frithjof Walk (Association of Automatic Identification 
and Mobility, AIM Global), Heinz-Paul Bonn (Federal Association for Information Technology, 
Telecommunications and New Media, BITKOM), Harald Kelter (Federal Office for Information Security, BSI), 
Christian von Grone (Gerry Weber), Markus Sprafke (Volkswagen), Gerald Santucci (Directorate General 
Information Society, European Commission), Johannes Landvogt (Federal Office for Data Protection and 
Freedom of Information), Barbara Daskala and Udo Helmbrecht (European Network and Information Security 
Agency, ENISA) as well as Andreas Krisch (European Digital Rights Association, EDRI) and Marie Ötzel 
(Vienna University of Economics and Business, WU Wien) for their support in the PIA Framework 
development process. I also want to thank Elizabeth Board (GS1 US) and Marisa Jimenez (formerly GS1) for 
their co-authorship of the PIA Framework and Paul Skehan (European Round Table, ERRT), Pierre Blanc 
(Carrefour), Joseph Alhadeff (Oracle, US), Veronique Corduant (Deutsche Post) and Daniel Caprio Jr. 
(McKenna Long & Aldridge, US) for their active stakeholder involvement.  
2 Opinion 9/2011 on the revised Industry Proposal for a Privacy and Data. Protection Impact Assessment 
Framework for RFID Applications ; URL: 
ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp180_en.pdf 
3 Fujitsu Research Institute,“Personal data in the cloud: the importance of trust”, Tokyo, 2010, pp. 8, 13. Fujitsu 
gathered its data from 500 consumers from each of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Finland, Germany, India, 
Japan, Singapore, Switzerland, the UK and US, for a total of 6,000. The data was gathered between June and 
September 2010. 
http://ts.fujitsu.com/rl/visit2010/downloads/Fujitsu_Consumer_Data_Privacy_Report_part2.pdf 
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Despite these growing concerns, privacy is not holistically regulated or even legally 
addressed in some countries. Instead, privacy regulation is an international patchwork that 
fails to establish a common trust framework for people while often forcing companies to 
incur a high transaction cost for compliance. In times of constant technical evolution, 
regulation often comes too late, lacks practical enforcement mechanisms and finds itself 
charged with crippling innovation. In response to this legal dilemma, regulators seek new 
ways to regulate privacy. Globally integrated, timely and effective privacy protection would 
be more feasible if global industry players, associations or whole sectors committed to 
institute common privacy procedures and integrate privacy-friendly architectures and defaults 
into their systems (“privacy by design”).  
One promising way to achieve this goal is to avoid regulating the dos and don’ts of 
specific technologies at a national level; instead, global industry players and sectors could 
embrace privacy impact assessments (PIA). “A PIA is a systematic process for evaluating the 
potential effects on privacy of a project, initiative or proposed system or scheme and finding 
ways to mitigate or avoid any adverse effects.”4 If PIAs were mandatory, companies would 
be forced to proactively investigate and prepare for potentially disadvantageous social 
implications of the technologies they build and deploy.  
PIAs are seen as a particularly promising way to confront the privacy challenges inherent 
in ambient computer services. PIAs enforce creative thinking about how the ethical 
challenges of ubiquitous, “always-on” technologies could be addressed; as a result, they 
stimulate innovation around socially attractive technologies instead of stifling their launch. 
One ambient technology that has stirred up particularly strong privacy debates and, as a 
result, became one of the first to be regulated with the help of a PIA, is radio frequency 
identification (RFID). With other wireless technologies such as Bluetooth or wireless LAN, 
RFID is a major building block of the “Internet of Things” or “ubiquitous computing 
environment”, envisioned by computer science (CS) researchers5. RFID tags embed “smart” 
chips that communicate with readers and transfer their information to a back-end 
infrastructure for processing and analysis. The wireless transfer of item information or object-
to-object communication is vital for many current services and products, new home and after-
sales services, real-time logistics, intelligent manufacturing, and more. In the next decade, it 
has been estimated that some 87 billion passive tags and 6 million readers will be deployed in 
Europe.6 
The reason why RFID has caused particularly strong privacy debates is the combination 
of three of its technological traits that raise consumer fears:  First, humans have always been 
afraid of the invisible. And this invisibility is manifest in many kinds of RFID that use chips 
too tiny to be recognised by the human eye, communicating information through fabrics and 
at long distances (6-8 meters for UHF frequencies) without a line of sight. Second, and unlike 
many other forms of IT, RFID cannot be “switched off”. For mobile phones and PCs, users 
can opt out of participation, go offline or switch off the device. For RFID – at least for the 
time being – this is not the case. And last but not least, RFID technology is expected to be 
                                                
4 Wright, David, “Should privacy impact assessments be mandatory?”, Communications of ACM,  Vol. 54, No. 
8, August 2011. 
5 Weiser, Marc, “The Computer for the 21st Century”, Scientific American, Vol. 265, No. 3, Sept 1991, pp. 94-
104. 
6 GS1 and Logica CMG, European passive RFID Market Sizing 2007-2022, Report of the BRIDGE Project, 
February 2007, p. 8. BRIDGE (Building Radio frequency Identification solutions for the Global Environment) 
was an Integrated Project funded by the European Commission.  
http://www.bridge-
project.eu/data/File/BRIDGE%20WP13%20European%20passive%20RFID%20Market%20Sizing%202007-
2022.pdf 
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ubiquitously deployed and present on or embedded in all products and product components 
carrying barcodes today, which means that the technology will be very pervasive very soon.7  
Because RFID is a highly promising building block of innovative service delivery, 
regulators at the EU level have avoided passing the kind of technology-specific “RFID Law” 
that was considered in the US.8  The risk of strangling RFID-related innovations was too 
great. Therefore, calling for PIAs for RFID has been regarded as the ideal political route. In 
May 2009, the European Commission issued a Recommendation in which it established a 
requirement for endorsement by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party of a 
framework for personal data and privacy impact assessments of RFID applications.9 This 
framework was to be developed by industry, but “in collaboration with relevant civil 
society”, according to Article 4 of the Recommendation. The resulting process framework (or 
“process reference model”) “is designed to help RFID Application Operators uncover the 
privacy risks associated with an RFID Application, assess their likelihood, and document the 
steps taken to address those risks”.10  
The road to agreement on this PIA framework, finally endorsed by the Art. 29 Working 
Party in February 201111, was a rocky one. The 18 months of political battle can be 
characterised by two PIA construction phases: Phase 1 led to the submission of an initial PIA 
Framework draft (PIA I) written under the auspices of GS1.12 It introduced a distinction 
between a PIA framework as a general outline for RFID PIA and PIA templates as concrete 
implementation guidelines.13 The draft fell victim to many of the typical pitfalls a PIA design 
can have: It focused on the general reporting of privacy issues only, avoided any kind of risk 
identification process, failed to link to any legal system already governing privacy in Europe 
and was written as a barely structured pamphlet in a language that Norbert Wiener would 
probably recognise as “forensic discourse”.14 Unsurprisingly, the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party (Art. 29 WP hereafter) rejected the piece as unacceptable.15  
                                                
7 Another “political” reason why RFID has led to such intense privacy debates is the industry’s strong push for 
RFID roll-out and perfection. In particular, the intent to make it the carrier medium of the future barcode has 
caused privacy rights organisations to become more alert to RFID than other technologies that penetrate markets 
slowly. 
8 Schmid, Viola, “Radio Frequency Identification Law Beyond 2007” in Christian Floerkemeier, Marc 
Langheinrich, Elgar Fleisch, Friedemann Mattern and Sanjay E. Sarma (eds.), The Internet of Things, 
Proceedings of IOT 2008, LNCS 4952, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2008,  pp. 196-212. 
9 European Commission, Recommendation on the implementation of privacy and data protection principles in 
applications supported by radio-frequency identification, C (2009) 3200 final,  Brussels, 12 May 2009. 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/rfid/documents/recommendationonrfid2009.pdf 
10 Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications [the “PIA Framework” 
hereafter], 11 February 2011, p. 3. http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/enet/policy_en.html 
11 Art. 29 Working Party, Opinion 9/2011 on the revised Industry Proposal for a Privacy and Data Protection 
Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications. 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp180_en.pdf 
12 GS1 is an international association dedicated to the development of global barcode numbering standards and 
the electronic management of these. It was formed by a merger of the European Article Number (EAN) 
Association and the Unified Code Council (UCC). GS1 chose RFID as the carrier medium for the barcode 
system and contributes strongly to the development of the technology. It wrote and edited the initially submitted 
PIA Framework (called “PIA I” by PIA Framework stakeholders and authors) in co-operation with the European 
retail industry (represented by the European Retail Round Table Association), a German association called 
“RFID Informationsforum” (later re-named ‘GS1’) and a group of other companies.   
13 The Recommendation called for a “framework” and not concrete PIA guidelines. The PIA “Framework 
identifies the objectives of RFID Application PIAs, the components of RFID Applications to be considered 
during PIAs, and the common structure and content of RFID Application PIA Reports” (PIA Framework, p. 4). 
The Framework “could be used as a basis for the development of industry-based, sector-based, and/or 
application-based PIA templates” (p. 3).  
14 In his influential work on cybernetics, Norbert Wiener distinguishes between two types of language: “one of 
which is intended primarily to convey information and the other to primarily impose a point of view against a 
Pre-publishing version; to appear in: Wright, David, and Paul de Hert, Privacy Impact Assessment: Engaging 
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In Phase 2 of the PIA Framework development, a European group from a variety of 
industries and academic backgrounds forced the initial authors to outline a methodology that 
identified privacy risks and mitigation strategies. This group also insisted that the PIA report 
provide enough details about an RFID application and its back-end infrastructure to allow for 
a comprehensible identification and judgement of such risks. 
 
As one of the co-authors of the RFID PIA Framework, I describe in this chapter the details of 
the methodology that was finally endorsed as well as means to apply it. I comment on the 
purpose and scope of RFID PIAs, the most important procedures, the reasoning behind them, 
and the meaning of details, definitions, formulations and structure. I also report on the 
stakeholder challenges overcome, the compromises reached and the lessons learned about 
PIA construction, at both a technical and political level.  
The structure of this article is based on four phases of a privacy impact assessment 
process for RFID (see figure 1). Some preliminary considerations lead to two main PIA 
process phases: initial analysis and privacy risk assessment. The initial analysis and privacy 
risk assessment are accompanied by documentation and reporting. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Process phases of a privacy impact assessment (PIA) for RFID 
 
In this chapter, I define and explain the terms and concepts of the RFID PIA Framework 
as I understand them as a co-author.16 Stakeholder discussions are tricky in that conflicting 
interests can result in “language” (usage of terms) in the final documents that leave room for 
interpretation. Any material that might be regarded as personal opinion or backroom 
information is included in the footnotes so it is not confused with the more factual frame of 
the main text. When I use the term “PIA Framework” in this chapter, I refer to the specific 
RFID PIA Framework endorsed on 11 February 2011. Official terminology from the RFID 
PIA Framework appears in italics the first time it is used in the text; the spelling of terms also 
matches the official document. If I excerpt a definition from the Framework, I provide the 
exact wording and details of the Framework’s text in the footnote section. For further 
information, the reader should refer to the official RFID PIA Framework published by the 
European Commission17. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
wilful opposition”. See Wiener, Norbert, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, Houghton 
Mifflin, New York, 1950.   
15 Readers interested in the concrete criticisms of PIA I can also consult the collection of documents published 
by the European Digital Rights Association (EDRI): 
http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number8.15/article-29-no-to-rfid-pia 
16 My role in this negotiation was that of rapporteur for the European Commission in the first phase of the PIA 
Framework development. I then led the negotiations for a German industry group in the second phase of the PIA 
Framework development and co-authored the PIA III Framework. 
17 The European Commission has posted the PIA Framework document as well as key documents that led to the 
final version on the Web. See http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/enet/policy_en.html as well as 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/rfid/pia/index_en.htm 
(2) 
Initial  
Analysis 
(3) 
Privacy Risk 
Assessment 
(1) 
Preliminary 
Considerations 
(4) Documentation & Reporting 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1.2  Preliminary considerations before engaging in a PIA 
 
Before engaging in the PIA core processes (initial analysis, privacy risk assessment), one 
must consider a few key points. These include the status of a company deploying RFID as an 
“RFID operator” in the sense of the PIA Framework (who), the scope of the relevant RFID 
application (what) and the timing of the PIA (when). 
The Commission’s Recommendation indicates that all RFID operators should assess the 
impact of their operations on privacy and data protection. It defines an RFID application 
operator as a “natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or any other body, which, 
alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of operating an application, 
including controllers of personal data using an RFID application”18. Yet, RFID is a widely 
used technology that is already embedded in many of today’s products and service 
architectures. Automobiles, for example, contain various RFID applications. RFID gates 
regularly support manufacturing processes. Ski resorts, public transport companies, toll 
collectors and event organisers use RFID infrastructures to efficiently manage access 
controls. As a result, the question is whether all of these RFID operators now and in the 
future need to immediately consider the privacy implications of their operations. What about 
tiny retailers or kiosks that may soon use RFID readers only to check out customers, 
replacing traditional barcode scanners with an RFID system? Are they all equally in need of a 
PIA? Will every car leaving the factory require a PIA prior to sale, just because it uses RFID 
for anti-theft protection? The scope of the PIA roll-out was a prominent issue in the 
preparation of the PIA Framework. 
The compromise embedded in the PIA Framework is that its procedures will have no 
retrospective effect and only apply if “significant changes in the RFID application” are 
made. The most significant changes are those that “expand beyond the original purposes” of 
the application, or lead to new “types of information processed; uses of the information that 
weaken the controls employed”.19 For example, if a fitness club uses lockers with RFID keys 
and later personalises the keys so that premium members can benefit from the use of their 
preferred lockers, then the upgrade of the RFID functionality would justify the need for a 
PIA. The PIA would be needed because the upgrade supplements the original locking 
function of the system with a customer-relationship function. 
In the context of this fitness club example, another aspect of scope becomes apparent: 
whether the fitness club is the RFID operator responsible for conducting the PIA. After all, 
fitness clubs are not technology providers; the function and technical architecture of the 
systems they use are often pre-determined by system vendors. As the goal of a PIA is not 
only to identify privacy risks, but also to mitigate them technically, can customers 
implementing an “out-of-the-box” RFID system be held responsible for privacy controls 
because they are the ones “operating” it? At this point, the definition of the RFID operator 
becomes important. The RFID operator is the entity determining the purposes and 
means of operation.20 This is indeed primarily the entity running the RFID application in its 
premises. However, seen that in many cases these commercial entities are not technically 
                                                
18 Recommendation, op. cit., Art. 3(e). 
19 The factors that would require a new or revised PIA include “significant changes in the RFID Application, 
such as material changes that expand beyond the original purposes (e.g., secondary purposes); types of 
information processed; uses of the information that weaken the controls employed; unexpected personal data 
breach with determinant impact and which wasn't part of the residual risks of the application identified by the 
first PIA; defining of a period of regular review; responding to substantive or significant internal or external 
stakeholder feedback or inquiry; or significant changes in technology with privacy and data protection 
implications for the RFID Application at stake” (PIA Framework, p. 5).  
20 See the glossary at Appendix B of the PIA Framework. 
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prone, it would often need to be the system vendor or system implementer and not necessarily 
the customer (such as the fitness club owner) who would carry the bulk of responsibility for 
conducting a PIA. The responsibility of system vendors also becomes important when they 
offer turnkey RFID systems. In this case, system vendors need to conduct PIAs, because they 
are the ones who determine the purposes and means of those applications. The authors also 
thought that in cases where RFID systems are tailored to customer needs, then system 
vendors would have the prime responsibility to inform their customers of the privacy 
implications of the RFID application and to use (potentially standardised) PIA templates to 
check for the privacy risks together with them.  
Another important issue to consider is when a PIA needs to be conducted. What 
constitutes a significant change of an RFID application? Here the definition of an RFID 
application becomes important because it outlines the breadth of the system landscape to be 
watched. An RFID application is “An Application that processes data through the use of tags 
and readers, and which is supported by a back-end system and a networked communication 
infrastructure” [PIA Framework, p. 23]. The consideration of RFID back-end systems’ 
links and sharing networks is important for a PIA kick-off. It is important because 
privacy problems often result from the “secondary” processing of data somewhere at the 
back-end of a system and outside of the particular application that initially collects and uses 
the data for a specific purpose. For example, a retailer may initially collect, store and process 
uniquely identified purchase item data for his RFID-enhanced inventory control application. 
These activities do not cause any privacy concerns. However, when the retailer decides that 
purchase data items should be forwarded to a back-end loyalty-card system containing 
customer identities, a privacy problem is created and a PIA or PIA upgrade is warranted. 
Thus, the RFID application borders considered for the PIA analysis and kick-off should 
be understood as the initial application collecting the RFID data plus all those 
networked communication infrastructures that receive the RFID-based data for 
additional purposes.  
Finally, a strong concern among stakeholders was whether a PIA would need to be 
conducted for every system and thus potentially every product that embeds an RFID 
application supported by a back-end infrastructure. For example, the automotive industry 
questioned whether each car containing an RFID-enabled anti-theft functionality supported 
by dealers’ car-owner databases would need a PIA. This would create an unjustifiable cost 
load to complete manufacturing. The PIA Framework therefore specifies that PIAs need to be 
done only once for a product series: “If RFID Application Operators reuse one RFID 
Application in the same way for multiple products, services or processes, they may create one 
PIA Report for all products, services or processes that are similar” (PIA Framework, p. 6). 
 
 
1.3  Initial analysis to determine the scope of PIA 
 
Some companies are RFID operators in the sense of the Framework but still don’t need to 
conduct a PIA because they simply don’t have a privacy problem. These RFID operators 
have RFID data that is never used for personal data processing or profiling. One only needs 
to think of a farmer using RFID for tagging his cattle. Furthermore, RFID applications differ 
in the degree to which they entail a privacy risk. For these reasons, an initial analysis can be 
used by RFID operators to assess whether and at what level of detail they need to conduct a 
PIA. The decision tree in figure 2 depicts the principal questions an RFID operator needs to 
consider in documented form for initial analysis. 
The key question at the outset of the initial analysis is whether the RFID application 
actually processes personal data or whether the RFID application links RFID data to personal 
Pre-publishing version; to appear in: Wright, David, and Paul de Hert, Privacy Impact Assessment: Engaging 
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data. The issue of linking must be understood in the context of the RFID application 
definition outlined above: Because the RFID application in the RFID PIA Framework is a 
broad system infrastructure that includes a data-sharing network at the back-end, one must 
ask whether that level contains links between RFID data and personal data. For example, a 
manufacturer may use RFID in manufacturing and for employees’ access control. The 
question is whether these two data sources could be linked at some point to investigate who 
had access to the manufacturing unit at a specific point in time. 
For those who are not privacy experts, it is crucial to note that in the initial analysis phase, 
“personal data” is understood in a legal sense. A layman would think of personal data as 
being information about an identified individual – a known person. In the legal sense, 
however, the definition of personal data is much broader. According to the EU Data 
Protection Directive, personal data is “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity”.21  
If a company does not handle personal data (right side of the decision tree), it may not 
need to conduct a PIA (Level 0, no PIA). Companies that do not handle personal data must 
conduct a PIA only if individuals will carry RFID tags that the companies process. This 
consideration (Q2b) was developed with a view to retailers who may process tags in their 
retail outlets that are passed on to their customers. The thinking here is that the process of 
using and passing on tags alone creates a responsibility for RFID operators to check 
whether they create privacy problems outside their own premises. 
If a company does handle personal data (left side of the decision tree) in conjunction with 
its RFID application (i.e., a retailer using unique purchase identifiers in conjunction with 
identifiable loyalty card data or a health care system involving patient data in a hospital), it 
must answer a second question (Q2a) about the personal data on the tags. If personal data is 
stored in tags, the privacy analysis requires more detail. In fact, the terminology of “levels” 
was introduced as an indicator for the level of detail expected for privacy analysis. The 
threat environment for privacy breach is enlarged in situations where personal data is not only 
stored at the back-end of an RFID application, but also directly on the tag. PIAs for these 
situations need to look at both domains: the back-end and the front-end. The level 
terminology does not refer to the level of risk inherent in an RFID application. In fact, 
future smart card applications may even benefit from storing more of an individual’s 
information directly on the tag and thus potentially under user control. Even though this kind 
of RFID application would require a careful a priori privacy analysis (level 3, full-scale PIA), 
it could be the more privacy-friendly system. After all, privacy scholars agree that 
decentralised data-processing architectures (ideally under user control) are more privacy 
friendly than centralised ones.22 
 
                                                
21 European Parliament and the Council, Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 24 October 1995, Art. 2(a).  
22 Spiekermann, Sarah, and Lorrie Faith Cranor, “Engineering Privacy”, IEEE Transactions on Software 
Engineering, Vol. 35, No. 1, January/February 2009, pp. 67-82. 
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Fig. 2: Initial decision tree on PIA necessity and scope  
 
A recurring question on the initial decision tree is how a full-scale PIA differs from a 
small-scale PIA. The UK and Canada make a distinction between small scale and full scale 
for PIAs.23 This distinction has been made because companies (in particular, small and 
medium enterprises) that do not process personal data in relation to RFID data should not be 
overburdened with a privacy analysis, even if they have to take some responsibility for 
passing tags that are then carried by individuals. An earlier version of the PIA Framework 
(dubbed “PIA II”24) actually contained separate process charts for small-scale and full-scale 
PIAs. Wright comments: “The phases in a small-scale PIA mirror those in a full-scale PIA, 
but a small-scale PIA is less formalized and does not warrant as great an investment of time 
and resources in analysis and information-gathering.”25 During the Framework development 
discussion, stakeholders suggested that responsibility for conducting a small-scale PIA could 
probably remain with the person or team who introduced the RFID application; furthermore, 
a small-scale PIA could dispense with the stakeholder process recommended for a full-scale 
PIA. Stakeholders also argued that entities developing PIA templates for whole sectors or 
product- and services lines should certainly run through a full-scale PIA. 
Ultimately, the initial analysis must be reported. One pitfall involved in the negotiation of 
PIA reports with industry is the difficulty of establishing consensus on what needs to be 
reported in the different phases of analysis. Companies often want to avoid a description of 
data flows, push for the publication of just a summary about the results of a PIA (as is the 
case in Canada), or both. Indeed, a major achievement for the RFID PIA Framework is that 
all of these common pitfalls were avoided. Europe’s PIA for RFID now states that the “initial 
                                                
23 See respectively [UK] Information Commissioners Office (ICO), Privacy Impact Assessment Handbook, 
Version 2.0, Wilmslow, Cheshire, June 2009, and Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Assessing the 
Privacy Impacts of Programs, Plans, and Policies, Audit Report of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 
Ottawa, 2007. 
24 Spiekermann, S., PIA II - A Proposal for a Privacy Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications, 
Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2011, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/enet/policy_en.html, 
published there under the title: German Industry Alternative Proposal on the RFID Privacy and Data Protection 
Impact Assessment Framework [21 Oct 2010]. 
25 Wright, op. cit. 
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analysis must be documented and made available to data protection authorities upon request” 
(PIA Framework, p. 6) and that this documentation not only describes the RFID application 
at a superficial level, but contains all information needed to judge the potential privacy 
impact of the system. This requirement implies that the RFID application description must 
contain detailed information about the method and purpose of data storage, processing and 
transfer. Table 1 shows what reporting elements must be contained in for an RFID 
application description according to Annex 1 of the RFID PIA Framework. Most of these 
information elements are not specific to RFID and may be used in other system contexts. 
 
RFID 
Application 
Operator 
• Legal entity name and location 
• Person or office responsible for PIA timeliness 
• Point(s) of contact and inquiry method to reach the Operator 
RFID 
Application 
Overview 
• RFID Application name 
• Purpose(s) of RFID Application(s) 
• Basic use case scenarios of the RFID Application 
• RFID Application components and technology used (i.e., frequencies, etc.) 
• Geographical scope of the RFID Application 
• Types of users/individuals impacted by the RFID Application 
• Individual access and control 
PIA Report 
Number 
• Version Number of PIA Report (distinguishing new PIA or just minor changes) 
• Date of last change made to PIA Report 
RFID Data 
Processing 
• List of types of data elements processed 
• Presence of sensitive information in the data being processed (health, for instance)? 
RFID Data 
Storage 
• List of types of data elements stored 
• Storage duration 
Internal RFID 
Data Transfer 
(if applicable) 
• Description or diagrams of data flows of internal operations involving RFID data 
• Purpose(s) of transferring the personal data 
External RFID 
Data Transfer  
(if applicable) 
• Type of data recipient(s) 
• Purpose(s) for transfer or access in general 
• Identified and/or identifiable (level of) personal data involved in transfer 
• Transfers outside the European Economic Area (EEA) 
Table 1 – Reporting elements of the initial analysis of an RFID application according to Annex I of 
the RFID PIA Framework   
 
 
1.4  PIA risk assessment process 
 
One of the biggest challenges for the PIA stakeholder process was to gain industry consent to 
a process for privacy risk assessment. Running through a proper process and reporting on its 
individual steps is more time-intensive and costly for companies than writing a report with 
less stringent requirements. Scholars agree that if PIAs “are conducted in a mechanical 
fashion for the purpose of satisfying a legislative or bureaucratic requirement, they are often 
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regarded as exercises in legitimization rather than risk assessment”.26 Coming up with the 
right process for PIAs was difficult because few publicly available, proven examples exist. 
The difficulty in developing the PIA risk assessment process was that it needed to be concrete 
enough to help uncover all (or at least most) privacy risks while being generic enough to 
cover all of the ways that RFID technology can be deployed. As with many modern quality 
management or business continuity activities, “completeness” for this process could only be 
achieved through a process reference model that enforced the identification of privacy risks 
and mitigation strategies with its procedure.  
If the initial analysis concludes that a PIA is necessary and the RFID application 
description is completed (as described in table 1), the first step of the risk analysis is also 
completed. The relevant material is gathered and status quo information is available (see 
figure 2). The next step (step 2) is to identify the privacy risks associated with the RFID 
application. 
 
 
Fig. 3: PIA risk assessment process [PIA Framework, p. 8] 
 
Laymen associate many meanings with the term “risk”. But for professional risk 
assessments, it is vital to embrace a precise and established definition. Most security risk 
assessments and respective ISO standards used as references27 for the PIA Framework agree 
on the following definition of risk: “a function of the likelihood of a given threat-source 
exercising a particular potential vulnerability and the resulting impact of that adverse event 
                                                
26 Wright, op. cit. 
27 These included: International Organization for Standardization (ISO), ISO/IEC 27005 Information technology 
– Security techniques – Information Security Risk Management, Geneva, 2008; Bartels, C., H. Kelter, R. 
Oberweis and B. Rosenberg, “Technische Richtlinie für den sicheren RFID-Einsatz”, in TR 03126, B.f.S.i.d. 
Informationstechnik, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Germany, 2009; European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA), Emerging and Future Risks Framework – Introductory Manual, 
Heraklion, 2010; Stoneburner, Gary, Alice Goguen and Alexis Feringa, National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST), Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems,  Recommendations of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-30,  July 2002. 
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on the organization”.28 This definition sees the extent of risk as a result of three main factors: 
(1) threats, (2) the likelihood of these threats and (3) their impact magnitude (see left side of 
figure 2). It is therefore vital to understand whether RFID applications actually threaten 
privacy and with what effects. When risks are assessed, the next step (step 3) in the risk 
assessment procedure calls for the RFID operators to identify controls that mitigate these 
risks. The final step (step 4) results in documentation and reflection on what has been done to 
reduce privacy risks and what remains to be done later (residual privacy risk). 
 
1.4.1  How is the risk assessment done step-by-step? 
 
Even though figure 3 suggests a relatively easy way to conduct the PIA risk assessment, 
putting this process into practice is not a trivial task. In fact, in order to reach consensus 
among the negotiating parties of the PIA Framework, a relatively high level of abstraction 
was chosen in the official document depicting the risk assessment process (Figure 3). That 
said, there are existing international risk assessment standards that can now be used to 
translate this overview process (Figure 3) into a practical step-by-step methodology (for 
example, the method proposed by the National Institute for Standards and Technology 
(NIST) 2010) can be helpful, even if this process relates exclusively to security 
assessments).27 One of the most usable and recognized methodologies to handle the details of 
the RFID risk assessment has been proposed by the German Federal Office for Information 
Security (BSI) [BSI2007]. By adhering to the BSI PIA standards outlined hereafter, a 
company signals its commitment to optimise its security and privacy operations according to 
timely standards in security management and EU data protection regulation. The step-by-step 
process that a company would need to run through is depicted in Figure 4. Here it becomes 
clear that an organisation needs to first understand its privacy targets, then analyse how these 
targets are threatened and finally judge risks based on the situation and existing control 
landscape (Figure 4). Each step is supported by an explicit keying scheme as well as tables 
which ensure the rigour of the methodology The next section will outline how to conduct a 
PIA according to this standard.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
28 Stoneburner, Goguen and Feringa, NIST,  op. cit., July 2002, p. 8. 
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Fig. 4: Full-scale PIA process in detail 
 
 
Defining privacy targets 
 
The purpose of the risk analysis is to understand what is at risk. What is the privacy 
protection target? The UK’s Privacy Impact Assessment Handbook regards the following 
aspects of privacy as being at risk and worth protecting: (1) privacy of personal information, 
(2) privacy of the person, (3) privacy of personal behaviour, and (4) privacy of personal 
communications.29 Yet, instead of putting these four privacy targets at the centre of the risk 
assessment, the PIA Framework consortium opted to take legislation as the starting point of 
risk analysis. Framed in a legal way, the Data Protection Directive formulates the nine 
privacy targets summarised in table 2 (and included in Annex II of the RFID PIA 
Framework). Note that every privacy target can have a key associated with it (P1, P2, … PN). 
These keys can later be linked to threats and controls (see Figure 5).30 The use of a key 
                                                
29 ICO, op. cit. 
30 The keys were part of PIA II, but omitted from the official and final PIA Framework document to avoid 
giving the impression that the Annex tables represent the complete methodology. 
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structure facilitates systematic risk assessment and is often employed by both privacy and 
security assessments.31 
 
 
Table 2: Privacy targets identified in Annex II of the PIA Framework 
 
The PIA Framework consortium took the articles of the Data Protection Directive as its 
privacy targets for several reasons. Most importantly, it is very useful and sensible to draw 
privacy threats from existing legal frameworks and thereby combine a PIA with a legal 
compliance check. While scholars tend to distinguish PIAs from compliance checks and 
privacy audits32, the stakeholder negotiation over RFID PIAs cast doubt on the value of this 
distinction: taking privacy legislation as a starting point for privacy threat analysis saves 
companies cost and time.33 If a company commits to invest in a (potentially cost intensive) 
                                                
31 Bartels, Cord, Harald Kelter, Rainer Oberweis and Birger Rosenberg, TR 03126 – Technische Richtlinie für 
den sicheren RFID-Einsatz, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Bonn, 2009; ENISA, 
Emerging and Future Risks Framework – Introductory Manual, op. cit.; ENISA, Flying 2.0 – Enabling 
automated air travel by identifying and addressing the challenges of IoT & RFID technology, Heraklion, 2010. 
32 Wright, op. cit. 
33 In fact, combining the RFID PIA process with a legal privacy compliance check was an important reason why 
major industry bodies got involved in the RFID PIA Framework definition in its second phase. The argument 
was that, especially for small and medium enterprises, investing in privacy issues twice – once for PIA and 
again for legal compliance – was unjustifiable.  
Description of privacy target 
 
(taken and updated from the respective EU Privacy Directive(s); here Directive 95/46/EC) 
Safeguarding quality of personal 
data 
 
Data avoidance and minimisation, purpose specification and 
limitation, quality of data and transparency are the key targets that 
need to be ensured.  
Legitimacy of processing 
personal data 
Legitimacy of processing personal data must be ensured either by 
basing data processing on consent, contract, legal obligation, etc.  
 
 Legitimacy of processing 
sensitive personal data 
 
Legitimacy of processing sensitive personal data must be ensured 
either by basing data processing on explicit consent, a special legal 
basis, etc.  
Compliance with the data 
subject’s right to be informed 
It must be ensured that the data subject is informed about the 
collection of his data in a timely manner.  
Compliance with the data 
subject’s right of access to data, 
correct and erase data 
It must be ensured that the data subject’s wish to access, correct, 
erase and block his data is fulfilled in a timely manner.  
 
Compliance with the data 
subject’s right to object 
 
It must be ensured that the data subject’s data is no longer processed 
if he or she objects. Transparency of automated decisions vis-à-vis 
individuals must be ensured especially.  
 
Safeguarding confidentiality 
and security of processing 
Preventing unauthorised access, logging of data processing, network 
and transport security and preventing accidental loss of data are the 
key targets that need to be ensured.  
Compliance with notification 
requirements 
Notification about data processing, prior compliance checking and 
documentation are the key targets that need to be ensured. 
Compliance with data retention 
requirements 
Retention of data should be for the minimum period of time 
consistent with the purpose of the retention or other legal 
requirements. 
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PIA, the minimum outcome it expects is the legal compliance of its operations. It should 
be noted that the PIA Framework stakeholder group did not view the EU’s Data Protection 
Directive as the only valid privacy target; the group also considered that its RFID PIA 
approach was sufficiently flexible to take into account other relevant jurisdictions, depending 
on where PIA will be used (e.g., in the US).  An alternative set of rules could, for example, be 
the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.34 
Taking current privacy laws as privacy targets makes the risk assessment process timely and 
adaptable for various regions. 
Making legal privacy rights the targets of privacy analysis also has practical benefits: 
Many PIA processes start with a difficult discussion of what privacy actually is in order to 
define what needs protection. Yet, as Lillian R. BeVier notes, “Privacy  is  a  chameleon-like  
word,  used denotatively  to  designate  a  range  of wildly  disparate  interests – from  
confidentiality of  personal  information  to  reproductive  autonomy – and connotatively  to  
generate  goodwill  on  behalf  of whatever  interest  is  being asserted  in  its  name.”35 As a 
result, stakeholder discussions about privacy targets can be lengthy and frustrating. Such 
discussions also risk producing an incomplete list of privacy issues that is more compromised 
than complete. The law, in contrast, is an undisputable common denominator that leads to 
acceptance of the resulting risk assessment.  
Taking legislation as a central starting point to define privacy targets also produced some 
valuable insight on how a PIA is different from a security risk assessment. In fact, security 
agencies such as the German BSI have been among the first organisations to look into the 
security of RFID systems and means to identify security risks.36 They tend to confine privacy 
targets to those data protection issues that are found in the security domain. Here privacy is 
typically manifest in four targets: The guarantee of anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability 
and unobservability.37 Yet, are these privacy targets suited to embrace the privacy rights 
manifest in European privacy law, such as the legitimacy of processing personal data or data 
subjects’ right to be informed and have access to her data? No. Security and data protection 
targets as found in security risk assessments often do not constitute viable privacy 
targets as such. However, they may offer the technical means to ensure the safeguarding 
of confidentiality and security of processing (as outlined in Articles 16-17 of the EU Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EC) or of the quality of personal data (Article 6). Consequently, 
for the purpose of PIAs, security targets can be described as nested within privacy targets. 
Many privacy targets can be met only if security targets are met.  
As mentioned above, legislation was used to constitute the privacy targets in the RFID 
PIA Framework. Yet taking legislation as the privacy target for PIA also has drawbacks. One 
is that data protection laws may not cover all of the privacy issues inherent in RFID. Laws 
often lag behind current technological developments and have varying foci and strengths. For 
                                                
34 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD, Paris, 23 Sept 1980. 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html 
35 BeVier, Lillian R., “Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some Reflections on 
Mechanisms for Privacy Protection”, William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Vol. 4, Issue 2,   1995, pp. 455-
506 [p. 458]. Cited also in Solove, Daniel J., “A Taxonomy of Privacy”, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, Vol. 154, No. 3, January 2006, pp. 477- 560. 
36 Bartels, Cord, Harald Kelter, Rainer Oberweis and Birger Rosenberg, TR 03126 - Technische Richtlinie für 
den sicheren RFID-Einsatz, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Bonn, 2009. As previously 
mentioned, the German BSI  published PIA templates that provide a detailed description of how PIAs for RFID 
can be conducted for e-ticketing applications in public transport and for events, as well as how they can be used 
for retail logistics and employee cards. These templates can be accessed for initial guidance at:  
https://www.bsi.bund.de/cln_165/EN/Topics/ElectrIDDocuments/RadioFrequencyIdentification/TR_RFID/trfid
_node.html 
37 See p. 51 in Bartels et al., supra. 
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example, focus group studies on privacy concerns around RFID revealed that people are 
afraid of being restricted, criticised or exposed through automatic object reactions.38 This 
concern relates to the possibility that RFID technology could be used to “paternalistically” 
regulate behaviour by observing and correctively influencing interactions with objects. This 
practice might breach the physical right to be let alone39 as a form of privacy. However, this 
law is not explicitly regulated by the EU Directive (although it is recognised in US common 
law); as a result, PIAs using the EU’s legal framework as the sole privacy target would 
probably fail to identify this risk. Some PIA experts therefore advise using the legal 
framework as a starting point to define PIA targets40 before questioning whether the list is 
really complete. 
 
Defining protection demand and importance categories 
 
Even though all privacy targets are equally important vis-à-vis the regulator, some of them 
will have different degrees of urgency from a company perspective. In security assessments, 
it is common practice that security targets (i.e., the confidentiality of data) are ranked 
according to the loss or damage that would result from their potential breach. Such a ranking 
of targets or formation of protection demand categories is important, because companies or 
regulators need to be aware of their most important points of system failure and they need to 
be able to prioritise security investments in those areas.  
However, the judgement of the relative priority of security targets is a challenge. The 
extent of damage can often not be evaluated solely in financial terms. In those cases, “soft” 
factors must be considered, such as the potential loss of a company’s reputation or the social 
implications for people in their roles as citizens or customers. An informed qualitative 
judgement of experts is therefore often used to estimate the amount of damage resulting from 
a security breach. According to this judgement, protection demand categories are formed (for 
a similar approach, see also BSI2008).  
When protection demand categories are formed for privacy targets, a challenge is that 
even fewer of them can be represented in monetary terms. For example, it is hard to judge 
how customers or citizens will react in cases where companies or regulators are not 
transparent enough, don't describe data processing practices to an adequate extent, etc. 
Nevertheless, the extent of consequences of privacy breaches should be anticipated for RFID 
operators as well as for customers of the RFID operator (the “data subjects”) in order to get a 
feeling for the importance and priority of different privacy measures. Customers could lose 
their social standing, money or even their personal freedom as a result of a privacy breach. 
But regardless of whether this actually happens or not, companies can also damage their 
reputation and brand when privacy breaches become known to their customers or the public 
at large through negative press coverage. RFID operators should, therefore, carefully consider 
how the breach of different privacy targets could differentially impact their market reputation 
or lead to financial compensation payments. Based on this judgement, they can prioritise the 
different privacy targets for their operations. For example, they can form protection demand 
categories “low – 1”, “medium – 2” or “high – 3”. In a later state of the risk assessment, such 
a categorisation can help to choose privacy controls that correspond in strength and vigour.  
 
 
                                                
38 Spiekermann, S., User Control in Ubiquitous Computing: Design Alternatives and User Acceptance, Shaker 
Verlag, Aachen, 2008. 
39 Warren, Samuel, and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. IV, No. 5, 15 
Dec 1890. 
40 ICO, op. cit. 
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Deducing privacy threats from privacy targets 
 
Once privacy targets are identified and prioritized as to their protection demand, they can be 
used to systematically deduce threats. The core question is how a privacy target is threatened. 
For example, compliance with a person’s right to be informed (P4) may be threatened by 
secret data collection (T10) or incomplete information about the data collection’s purpose 
(T11). Again, keys (P4, T10) can be used to systematically link privacy targets to privacy 
threats. Annex III of the PIA Framework contains a relatively extensive but incomplete list of 
potential threats with RFID-specific examples. Depending on the industry and the RFID 
application at hand, RFID operators can pick and comment on the potential threats from this 
list that are relevant to their operations. Alternatively, RFID operators may also need to add 
other threats that are more meaningful to them. Sector-specific PIA templates, which will be 
developed from this framework and for use in different industries, may inform threat 
identification in greater detail. Figure 5 visualises the link between privacy targets and threats 
with the help of keys. 
 
Fig. 5: Deriving privacy threats from privacy targets systematically 
 
Not all threats given as examples in the PIA Framework Annex III may be equally 
probable. Many of them will not materialise at all from a specific operator’s perspective. An 
RFID operator must therefore identify those threats that are likely to occur in the respective 
organisation. Threats can occur from within and outside of the particular system at hand and 
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derive from likely uses and possible misuses of the information. A full-scale PIA would 
typically involve a stakeholder group identifying threats and determining their likelihood. 
This group should include the technical staff responsible for the RFID roll-out, managers who 
will benefit from RFID data, those responsible for data protection of the respective RFID 
operator (if there is one) and end users of the RFID service. Potentially, additional external 
stakeholders, such as privacy rights groups, may be consulted. But obviously many 
companies will be reluctant to do so. 
In security risk assessments, threats and their likelihood are identified and judged based 
on the vulnerability of a system.41 Vulnerability analysis identifies the technical weaknesses 
of a system that may be exploited by an attacker. Yet, can this methodology be transferred to 
a PIA? How does a vulnerability relate to a privacy threat? In preparing the PIA Framework, 
the authors found that RFID operators may fail to meet the privacy targets of the legal 
environment due to two kinds of threats: (1) threats caused by neglect of privacy-friendly 
practices and (2) threats caused by the exploitation of a RFID system’s technical 
vulnerability. Consequently, in the privacy context, threats can originate in the technology or 
stem from poor privacy management. The threat analysis of a PIA can benefit by 
systematically distinguishing between these two kinds of threats. 
One threat of particular concern in the RFID context is the potential secrecy of data 
collection that may undermine a data subject’s right to be informed that an RFID is being 
used. The rating of privacy threats should therefore consider the read-range difference, 
which depends on the type of RFID technology used. Different frequencies make it more or 
less likely that secret tracking of RFID tags can take place and therefore cause a greater or 
lesser number of privacy threats. For example, the UHF frequency entails a potentially 
higher privacy threat than HF or LF. Proximity technology (ISO/IEC 14443) causes fewer 
privacy threats than vicinity technology (ISO/IEC 15693). Nevertheless, independent of the 
technology, it is also necessary to consider how easy it is to get the reader in the vicinity of 
the tag without drawing attention to it. 
Finally, a prime subject of debate is the threat that RFID tags could be used to profile or 
track individuals.42 The RFID tag’s information – in particular its identifier(s) – would be 
used as a sort of “cookie” to re-recognise, profile and track an individual. Retailers who pass 
RFID tags to customers without automatically deactivating them at check-out may 
unintentionally enable this threat. For this reason, the EC’s Recommendation contains a 
special retail section that is repeated in the RFID PIA Framework. It states:  
 
A risk that has caused a prime subject of debate is that RFID Tags could be used for the 
profiling and/or tracking of individuals. In this case the RFID Tag’s information – in 
particular its identifier(s) – would be used to re-identify a particular individual. Retailers who 
pass RFID Tags on to customers without automatically deactivating or removing them at the 
checkout may unintentionally enable this risk. A key question, though, is whether this risk is 
likely and actually materialises into an undismissable risk or not. According to point 11 of the 
RFID Recommendation, retailers should deactivate or remove at the point of sale tags used in 
their application unless consumers, after being informed of the policy in accordance with this 
Framework, give their consent to keep the tags operational. Retailers are not required to 
deactivate or remove tags if the PIA report concludes that tags that are used in a retail 
application and would remain operational after the point of sale do not represent a likely 
threat to privacy or the protection of personal data as stated in point 12 of the same 
Recommendation. Deactivation of the tags should be understood as any process that stops 
                                                
41 Stoneburner, Goguen and Feringa, NIST, op. cit. 
42 Guenther, Oliver, and Sarah Spiekermann, “RFID and the perception of control: the consumer's view”, 
Communications of the ACM, Vol.  48, Issue 9, 2005, pp. 73-76. 
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those interactions of a tag with its environment which do not require the active involvement of 
the consumer [PIA Framework, p. 9]. 
The PIA Framework authors and stakeholders debated at length about whether and how 
the PIA Framework should contain clear guidance for the retail sector on when to 
deactivate. All agreed that the “likelihood” of this profiling and tracking risk depends on 
three main factors: (1) the volume of RFID readers that RFID operators use officially 
outside a retailer’s premises that gather RFID tags’ data in a way the individual cannot 
control, (2) the volume of RFID tags passed on to customers that are “left on” and (3) the 
number of malicious attackers that will regularly and personally spy on consumers’ assets. 
Furthermore, all retail stakeholders involved in the negotiations agreed to abstain from the 
reading of “foreign” tags as part of their PIA controls. If foreign tags were processed, they 
agreed that they would need to use privacy-by-design methods to mitigate the creation of 
personally identifiable data from tag information. They argued that either of these two 
control methods would sufficiently mitigate the threat of uncontrollable profiling or 
tracking, making the risk “dismissible” (not likely enough to require deactivation). This 
agreement was supposed to be included in a separate “Deactivation Annex” in the PIA 
Framework.  
What retail stakeholders could not agree on, unfortunately, was a threshold level at 
which the volume of left-on RFID tags is so high that deactivation becomes a necessity. One 
retailer suggested that the threshold level would be reached when retailers use RFID tags for 
anti-theft purposes and thus embed dual-functionality RFID tags in all products that they 
seek to protect. At this point, (most) retailers will heavily invest in the RFID infrastructure 
at their checkout systems; it must be assumed that they would do so only for a reasonably 
large volume of tags. However, not all retail stakeholders could agree to this “anti-theft” 
threshold suggestion. Consequently, it was not included in the Annex, leaving this Annex 
with relatively little material that addresses the “deactivation dilemma”. As a result, 
informal feedback from the WP 29 Technical Subgroup viewed the Annex as an attempt by 
retailers to get around the deactivation provision. As a further result, the “deactivation 
decision” was postponed and no information on it was included in the PIA Framework 
except for a repetition of what was already agreed in the May 2009 EC Recommendation 
(see above).  
 
Identifying and implementing controls to mitigate privacy risks 
 
The crucial step in the privacy risk assessment process is to identify controls that can help to 
“minimise, mitigate or eliminate the identified privacy risks” [PIA Framework, p. 10]. First, 
controls are considered that are implemented already or available for implementation. This 
helps operators judge real threats and their likelihood. Then, the identified threats as well as 
the protection demand level of the respective privacy target should guide the decision on 
which of the identified controls are relevant and thus need to be implemented. Figure 6 
visualises this relationship.  
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Fig. 6: Assessing and controlling privacy risks 
 
Controls are either of a technical or non-technical nature. Technical controls are 
incorporated into an application, e.g., access control mechanisms, authentication mechanisms 
and encryption methods. Non-technical controls, on the other hand, are management and 
operational controls, e.g., policies or operational procedures. Controls can be categorised as 
being preventive or detective. Preventive controls inhibit violation attempts, while detective 
controls warn operators about violations or attempted violations. In the privacy context 
specifically, it is important to note a category of “natural” privacy controls created by the 
environment. Natural privacy controls are physical or social artefacts in the environment that 
enforce privacy-sensitive behaviour simply through the force of their existence. For example, 
if no readers that can conduct a tracking of items or individuals are physically installed (i.e., 
because there is no business case for it), then “naturally” there is also no (likely) threat to 
privacy. Similarly, a social rule to avoid staring at people also acts as a natural privacy 
control. A list of control examples for RFID is included in Annex IV of the PIA Framework. 
Many of them were drawn from the catalogue of EuroPrise43, an entity that helps companies 
understand how privacy friendly their systems are. 
 
 
                                                
43 https://www.european-privacy-seal.eu/ See also Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-
Holstein, EuroPrise Criteria, Version 1.0, Kiel, Germany, 2009. 
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1.5  PIA reporting 
 
To save companies’ time, the RFID application description, as outlined in Annex I of the PIA 
Framework, always constitutes the first part of a more complete PIA report. If this first part 
reveals that the RFID application under scrutiny processes personal data in relation to RFID 
or allows for personal profiling with the help of RFID, then a privacy risk analysis must be 
completed; furthermore, every step of this analysis must be fully documented and included in 
the PIA report. From an organisational perspective, it is sensible to report conclusions made 
at each step outlined above in figure 3. Just publishing a summary of the risk analysis is not 
acceptable under the RFID PIA Framework. 
That said, a major point of debate in the PIA negotiation process was the question of who 
would receive the privacy analysis and to what extent such detailed reports would need to be 
public. In Canada, for example, government institutions have to post PIA summaries on their 
website. Companies involved in the RFID PIA negotiations were strongly opposed to the idea 
that internal data flows and processing operations might leak outside the company or even be 
exposed to competitors. This issue is of particular concern where RFID is used to enable 
product functionality through the technology’s object-object recognition capability (e.g., in-
car communication). Here company-internal innovation processes and legitimate competitive 
secrecy conflict with the ambitions of privacy reporting. 
The compromise reached for RFID PIAs is that PIA reports will not be public, but 
must be made available to competent authorities in line with section IX of the Directive 
95/46/EC. This requirement means that, in most cases, a company’s data protection official or 
the department responsible for the RFID deployment will prepare the PIA report for 
authorities. 
The PIA Framework contains an important distinction between reporting and scheduling 
the PIA process: “Scheduling of the PIA process [shall be] so that there is sufficient time to 
make any needed adjustments to the RFID Application” [PIA Framework, p. 4]. In contrast, 
the “PIA Report [shall be made] available to the competent authorities at least six weeks 
before deployment” [PIA Framework, p. 4]. This distinction is made because the whole 
purpose and goal of PIAs is “to run through (a) risk assessment phase well before final 
decisions on an RFID Application’s architecture are taken so that technical privacy mitigation 
strategies can be embedded into the system’s design, and do not need to be ‘bolted on’ later” 
[PIA Framework, p. 8]. This implies that PIAs need to be kicked off in the early requirements 
definition phase of an application design or upgrade; the need is also recognised for security 
engineering (as the above-cited NIST guide makes clear). 
 
 
1.6  Conclusion 
 
The development and endorsement of the RFID PIA Framework is a great achievement for 
the European privacy landscape on many grounds. First, one of the technologies that has the 
most potential to intrude on personal privacy can be controlled through a procedure that 
promises a relatively complete, holistic and proactive tackling of the problem. The 
methodology will help RFID operators assess whether, why and to what extent their RFID 
applications entail a privacy risk; it will also help them identify viable strategies for 
minimising these risks. Second, the methodology outlined in the Framework leaves 
companies enough room to adapt it to their industry or their specific conditions. This 
adaptability, along with the ability to ensure legal compliance by using privacy legislation as 
the target of analysis, promises a wide acceptance of the PIA Framework methodology. 
Third, the RFID PIA guide is, to my knowledge, the first PIA guide developed by industry 
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instead of data protection authorities. It is a result of a true and difficult stakeholder process. 
It may therefore find wider backing from the industry than a top-down PIA or regulation 
would receive. Most importantly, it was a true international effort. The Framework was 
motivated and edited mostly in the EU, but US technology policy-makers influenced it 
heavily. For this reason, the Framework contains no terminology in the main text that would 
limit it to European borders. Consequently, some US companies and industry bodies will 
probably promote its use as well. Finally, the RFID PIA is generic enough to be adaptable to 
other technologies of the Internet of Things. It can be taken as a starting point or even a 
blueprint for how to do privacy impact assessments generally. 
Despite these promising facts, some challenges lie ahead. The PIA Framework will enter 
a proof-of-concept phase. All industries using RFID will need to develop PIA templates. 
Tools are needed to support the methodology. Industry associations will need to set standards 
for how to go about PIAs in their respective domains. All of this will take time and effort on 
the part of companies. At this point, the question becomes: to what extent are companies 
really willing to comply with the rules that they have set for themselves? So far, it is unclear 
where in an organisation a PIA would be kicked off. Who would typically have the 
responsibility? And at what points in time do specific criteria require a PIA upgrade? 
An open question is also what will happen if companies do not comply with the PIA 
Framework methodology. Will there be any sanctions? Or could this PIA Framework become 
mandatory for RFID operators? If not, how can companies be rewarded for their willingness 
to embrace PIA? Will established privacy seals or auditing companies incorporate the PIA 
Framework methodology into their controlling operations?  
The trade associations who have developed and, most importantly, signed the RFID PIA 
Framework – GS1, the German Association for IT, Telecommunications and New Media 
(Bitkom), the Association of Automatic Identification and Mobility (AIM), the European 
Retailers Round Table (ERRT) and the European-American Business Council (EABC) – will 
undoubtedly come back with some answers in due course. 
 
 
